Internet Engineering Task Force Chen, Ed. Internet-Draft L. Su Intended status: Informational China Mobile Expires: 19 May 2024 16 November 2023 The Requirements for Secure Routing Path draft-chen-secure-routing-requirements-02 Abstract Both ISPs and users have put forward requirements for secure routing, the scenarios are analyzed in the draft draft-chen-secure-routing- use-cases (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-secure- routing-use-cases/). This draft analyzes the functions required to implement secure routing. Attack detection and users security requirements translateion are out of scope. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2024. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Chen & Su Expires 19 May 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Requirements November 2023 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Requirements for Secure Routing Path . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Appraise node trustworthiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Expression of security capability . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Node security capability collection protocol . . . . . . 4 2.4. Distribution of security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.5. Secure path validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction Starting from the requirements of network operators and users, it is necessary to take the security attribute as the key factor to select the route and transmission path to measure the link transmission security. To achieve this goal, the following contents need to be studied. 1. Static node security, by appraising the trustworthiness, then it can be determined whether the node is secure and whether the node has security abilities; 2. Dynamic Security, by path scheduling, then it can be determined whether the path is secure and whether the path have the abilities to anti-cyberattack; 3. Close-loop validation, by path validation, then it can check whether the selected path and the executed path are consistent; Implementing a secure routing path will involve multiple protocols: 1. Expression of node security capability and trustworthiness, by YANG Model; 2. Collect node trust and security factors, and advertise through extending the BGP protocol; Chen & Su Expires 19 May 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Requirements November 2023 3. Collect available status information of security devices and resources through network nodes, such as extending BGP-LS; 4. Collect JSON messages carrying security resource information through the Restful; 5. Distribute security policy configuration through the Netconf; 6. Distribute traffic forwarding paths through programming, such as SRv6; 7. Perform consistency verification on paths and security services, such as extending the SFC. +-------------------+ |Network Programming| ------------------->|Controller AND | |Secure Routing | +---------+---------+ | | | +----------------------+--------+---------------+--------------+ | | | | | | | | 3.Distribute routing policy | 2.collect node information | with security policy | include security capability | | | | | +---+----+ +--+---+ +--+---+ | |Ingress | |Node2 | |Node1 | +--+--+ |Node | |IPS | |WAF | |Node2| +--------+ +------+ +------+ +-----+ 1.YANG Model: expression of Node security information 2. Requirements for Secure Routing Path 2.1. Appraise node trustworthiness Evaluate routing nodes, such as whether they are secure boot and the security level of the nodes. By Performing static security assessment on routing nodes, can provide a foundation for forming trusted or secure paths. In another draft, the concept of trusted path routing in draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path- routing/) was mentioned, which addresses the issue of security evaluation for node self initiation. Chen & Su Expires 19 May 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Requirements November 2023 2.2. Expression of security capability YANG model is used to describe the security capability of nodes, such as security service type and remaining capacity. 2.3. Node security capability collection protocol Collect the security capabilities of all nodes in the network, one solution is through BGP-LS, draft-chen-idr-bgp-ls-security-capability (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-idr-bgp-ls-security- capability/) extend BGP-LS to carry security capability information. 2.4. Distribution of security policy Security policies can be distributed through extended SRv6 SRH. 2.5. Secure path validation Perform consistency verification on paths and security services, At present, this draft-liu-on-network-path-validation (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-on-network-path- validation/) provides ideas for path validation. 3. IANA Considerations This memo includes no request to IANA. 4. Security Considerations TBD Authors' Addresses Meiling Chen (editor) China Mobile BeiJing China Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com Li Su China Mobile BeiJing China Email: suli@chinamobile.com Chen & Su Expires 19 May 2024 [Page 4]