An update for netty is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1 Security Advisory openeuler-security@openeuler.org openEuler security committee openEuler-SA-2021-1161 Final 1.0 1.0 2021-05-06 Initial 2021-05-06 2021-05-06 openEuler SA Tool V1.0 2021-05-06 netty security update An update for netty is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1. Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. %package help Summary: Documents for %{name} Buildarch: noarch Requires: man info Provides: %{name}-javadoc = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: %{name}-javadoc < %{version}-%{release} %description help Man pages and other related documents for %{name}. Security Fix(es): Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is True: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.(CVE-2021-21295) Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to True. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.(CVE-2021-21409) An update for netty is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1. openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of medium. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section. Medium netty https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161 https://openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail.html?id=CVE-2021-21295 https://openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail.html?id=CVE-2021-21409 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21295 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21409 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1 netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.aarch64.rpm netty-help-4.1.13-11.oe1.noarch.rpm netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.src.rpm netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.x86_64.rpm Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is True: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`. 2021-05-06 CVE-2021-21295 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1 Medium 5.9 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N netty security update 2021-05-06 https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161 Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to True. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final. 2021-05-06 CVE-2021-21409 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1 Medium 5.9 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N netty security update 2021-05-06 https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161