| Type: | Package |
| Title: | Constructing an Epistemic Model for the Games with Two Players |
| Version: | 0.1.2 |
| Author: | Bilge Baser |
| Maintainer: | Bilge Baser <bilge.baser@msgsu.edu.tr> |
| Imports: | stats,utils |
| Depends: | lpSolve |
| Description: | Constructing an epistemic model such that, for every player i and for every choice c(i) which is optimal, there is one type that expresses common belief in rationality. |
| License: | GPL-3 |
| LazyData: | TRUE |
| RoxygenNote: | 6.0.1 |
| Suggests: | testthat |
| NeedsCompilation: | no |
| Packaged: | 2017-05-12 10:08:01 UTC; lenovo |
| Repository: | CRAN |
| Date/Publication: | 2017-05-12 11:13:59 UTC |
Eliminating strictly dominated choices
Description
This function eliminates strictly dominated choices.
Usage
esdc(n, m, A, choices.A, B, choices.B, iteration)
Arguments
n |
an integer representing the number of choices of player 1 |
m |
an integer representing the number of choices of player 2 |
A |
an nxm matrix representing the payoff matrix of player 1 |
choices.A |
a vector of length n representing the names of player 1's choices |
B |
an nxm matrix representing the payoff matrix of player 2 |
choices.B |
a vector of length m representing the names of player 2's choices |
iteration |
an integer representing the iteration number of algorithm |
Details
This function works for the games with two players.
Value
The reduced matrices of players' that are obtained after eliminating strictly dominated choices
Author(s)
Bilge Baser
Examples
a=4
b=4
pay.A=matrix(c(0,3,2,1,4,0,2,1,4,3,0,1,4,3,2,0),4,4)
ch.A=c("Blue","Green","Red","Yellow")
pay.B=matrix(c(5,4,4,4,3,5,3,3,2,2,5,2,1,1,1,5),4,4)
ch.B=c("Blue","Green","Red","Yellow")
iter=5
esdc(a,b,pay.A,ch.A,pay.B,ch.B,iter)
Finding types that express common belief in rationality for optimal choices
Description
This function takes the reduced payoff matrices and finds out the probabilities for the types that expresses common belief in rationality for optimal choices.
Usage
type(A, B, choices.A, choices.B)
Arguments
A |
an nxm matrix representing the reduced payoff matrix of player 1 |
B |
an nxm matrix representing the reduced payoff matrix of player 2 |
choices.A |
a vector of length n representing the names of player 1's choices |
choices.B |
a vector of length m representing the names of player 2's choices |
Details
This function works for the games with two players. It returns infeasible solution for the irrational choices.
Value
Probabilities of the types that expresses common belief in rationality for optimal choices
Author(s)
Bilge Baser
See Also
lp
Examples
Ar=matrix(c(0,3,2,4,0,2,4,3,0),3,3)
choices.Ar=c("Blue","Green","Red")
Br=matrix(c(5,4,4,3,5,3,2,2,5),3,3)
choices.Br=c("Blue","Green","Red")
type(Ar,Br,choices.Ar,choices.Br)